BHHRG

The defeat of the anti-rejectionist parties in the December election led to the revival of the Annan Plan in January 2004. Although the CTP and its allies had demanded that Denktaş resign as TRNC’s main negotiator, he was kept on after consultations with Ankara. This in itself reflected divisions in society where the elder statesman still commanded popularity and respect. However, after leading the TRNC delegation in a preliminary visit to New York in February, Denktaş stepped down as final negotiations loomed, saying he could not advise acceptance of the plan as it stood.
As the parties had agreed to let the UN Secretary General ‘fill in the gaps’ in the parts of the plan where no agreement had been reached, arrangements were made for talks to be held, leaving time for a last-minute referendum to be called before the 1st May deadline on the final version of the document. At the same time, Erdogan was offered various sweeteners to reward TRNC (and Turkey) for their cooperation.
The ‘last chance saloon’, so to speak, was in the Swiss Alpine resort of Burgenstock. Rauf Denktaş washed his hands over any further negotiations, saying the present proposals were contrary to the constitution of TRNC. Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktaş led the negotiatiing team from the north. However, Mr. Papadopolous did attend as the Republic of Cyprus had agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Plan. The prime ministers of Greece and Turkey were also in attendance as was Britain – all three countries were signatories to the Treaty of Guarantee (signed in 1960) which remains in existence. The EU was represented in the person of Mr. Verheugen while the US remained behind the scenes, but actively endorsing a solution.
By this stage the penny had firmly dropped that Mr. Papadopolous was the main obstruction to an agreement. Gossip started to emerge from Burgenstock that the Greek Cypriots were now the bad boys, relegated to a corner with a bag of sandwiches while the Turkish Cypriots sat at the top table drinking champagne. The deal that emerged offered the Greeks the following concessions:
1.TRNC territory to be handed back to the south reduced from 37% to 29%, an increase of 5%;
2.Reduction in the number of Turkish troops that would remain on the island to 6,000 by 2011 and 1,600 by 2018. Eventually, 650 Turkish and 950 Greek troops would remain;
3.Increase in the number of Greek Cypriot returnees.

However, Turkey also received concessions. Although 33% of the 1974 expellees could return to their former homes, two thirds would be compensated in bonds and property appreciation certificates (PAC) - but only after five years. TRNC would now be able to ban permanent residency for Greek Cypriots for 5 years – apart from on the Karpas peninsula and for those over 65 years of age. Greek Cypriots would not be able to buy property in TRNC for 19 years or until Turkey joins the EU.
Turkey would be allowed to keep troops on the island until 2018 and even after that 650 would remain, the situation to be reviewed if/when Turkey joined EU. The number of mainland Turks who would be allowed to remain after the Plan’s adoption remained at 45,000 but there was no more talk of repatriation or of people being ‘forced’ off the island.
There was also tinkering with the balance of representation on the future unified island’s governing institutions. The latest version of the Plan gave Greek and Turkish Cypriots equal representation in the future Senate.
The revised plan – its fifth version – was presented to the delegates at Burgenstock on 31st March. It contained the text with 9,000 pages of annexes. According to the BBC “the revised plan was still being written less than an hour before being handed over – only one copy per delegation was printed in time”.[1] Although the new version “contained major changes”, according to a UN official, it was admitted that “details of the plan have not been made widely available” and that the two sides would have “just three days” to consider the text. Quentin Oliver, a referendum expert, remarked that before going before the electorate “it is standard practice to allow voters 6 weeks to digest the issues”.[2] Even supporters of an agreement said that there was “too little time for an informed decision”.[3] It was openly accepted that no one had read the latest version. Those who complained that it was being railroaded through were told to stop being spoilsports by niggling over the small print and concentrate on the ‘achievement’.
But, although the Turkish side seemed happy, President Papadopolous refused to endorse the new version, so the ‘process’ sputtered on according to Annan’s timetable with the referendums scheduled to take place on 24th April, little more than three weeks after the delegates left Switzerland.

The Referendum

BHHRG observed the conduct of the referendum on 24th April in both the north and south of the island. Although opinion polls had consistently shown a majority against, it was only after the Burgenstock talks that the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Plan seemed inevitable. According to all those involved in the negotiations, this would mean the end of any serious attempt at reunifying the island for the foreseeable future. For a long time, complacency had ruled with commentators predicting that the Greek Cypriots would ‘come round’ in time for the referendum.
However, during a visit to the republic in June 2003, BHHRG was left in no doubt that people did not want a settlement based on the Annan Plan. The Group got the impression that, in the absence of a complete return to the status quo ante of 1974, Greek Cypriots had no interest in reaching an agreement with TRNC. It is easy to forget that over 167,000 people were expelled from the north in 1974. They and their relatives make up a large part of the population of 660,000 who live in the south and they are in no mood to forgive and forget.
It is also hard to see what Annan had to offer them. Cyprus has a vibrant economy and was scheduled to enter the EU in May 2004. Many feared that talk about ‘international donor conferences’ only served to hide the fact that they would be left footing the bill for some of the Plan’s more costly proposals, including property restitution and population transfers. They also wanted the complete demilitarisation of the north something which is not even contemplated before 2018. Many Greek Cypriots fear that the Turkish army could attack them again if a future dispute was to arise as the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee remains extant under the Plan.
After Burgenstock, anger was openly directed towards President Papadopolous for his failure to back the Plan and his later address to the nation in which he urged the public to reject it. The implication was that people needed a ‘lead’ while forgetting that they had voted for him in the first place as he was perceived as being a tougher negotiator than his predecessor, the more emollient Glavkos Clerides. There was also much criticism of the referendum campaign in the south and the government’s failure to ensure that the ‘Yes’ campaign had proper exposure. However, various sections of Greek Cypriot society had already expressed strong reservations about it, including the governor of the central bank and the civil service. Although the government was berated for allowing misinformation to circulate about a likely loss of civil service jobs under Annan, even the plan’s supporters had to admit that there were proper concerns. There were also fears of future deficits being passed on to the central government “if valuations and compensation for properties in the poorer north are increased to match those in the south”.[4]
The only major party supporting the plan was the right-wing Democratic Rally Party (DISY) but even it had dissenters in the ranks; two thirds of the party’s supporters voted ‘no’ as did 40% of former president George Vassiliou’s (pro-agreement) United Democrats. The smaller New Horizons and Green Party were hostile. However, the biggest blow to the referendum’s success came when the Communist Party (AKEL) general secretary, Demetris Christofias, demanded a postponement of the vote – otherwise AKEL would have to recommend a ‘no’ vote to its members. The Communist (AKEL) and Papadopolous’ş Democratic Party (DIKO) are coalition partners in the current government. AKEL had always been perceived as pro-settlement but at a special party congress[5] held in March, delegates presumably realised that Annan was so unpopular with the public that the party could actually lose support if it was to endorse the plan.
It was alleged that ‘yes’ campaign posters had been defaced. There weren’t many visible on the streets of Nicosia, most posters and flyers were for ‘oxi’ – no. But, in truth, there was little public visibility of either side’s campaign. Teachers had been, allegedly instructed to encourage their students to promote a ‘no’ vote and they “were provided with ‘No’ banners by their teachers”[6] But, whereas on previous visits BHHRG had encountered Greek Cypriot refugee activists, from Kyrenia, demonstrating at the Green Line they were not there on referendum day neither were Greek Cypriots travelling to the north that day. Several bishops of the Orthodox church attracted attention, for example, Bishop Pavlos of Kyrenia who said that all ‘yes’ supporters would go to hell.
The media was attacked for the same reasons, even though its overall response was mixed. The English-language press in the south – The Cyprus Mail and Sunday Mail as well as the Financial Mirror were almost hysterically pro-settlement. The views of such papers are not irrelevant in a country which was once a British colony, where everyone speaks English and where c. 4000 British troops and their dependents live. The local, Greek-language press presented a variety of views but it was still criticized for failing to present the referendum choices objectively, something denied by Kypros Chrystomides, the government spokesman. Even the Cyprus Mail had to admit that while the “’No’ campaign had been given more airtime, individual politicians were all ‘yes’”[7] The attacks on the media in the south reached their zenith with Cyprus TV’s refusal to allow EU enlargement commissioner, Guenter Verheugen, to address the nation on the Plan’s virtues days before the referendum on the grounds that this could be construed as outside interference in the election process.
Mr. Verheugen (who had demanded a two-hour interview!) was outraged - he felt “cheated” by the Cypriot government. “For months on end” he wailed “I have done everything I could in good faith to make it possible for the Greek Cypriot side to accept this plan on the understanding that this is what they intended to do”.[8] One has to wonder what Verheugen means here when he refers to the government’s “intentions” - surely, the public was the ultimate arbiter of the referendum’s outcome. Or, did Mr. Verheugen expect a more propagandistic tone from the authorities, like the one expressed over the Green Line? Anyway, quite why Mr. Verheugen - an EU official - should be allowed to address the Cypriot population on the merits of a UN sponsored plan was never addressed. In fact, in the case of the republic, the EU’s views were superfluous at this stage as Cyprus was already on the brink of membership of the union. If anything, Verheugen’s petulant intervention was probably counter-productive and notched up a few more ‘oxi’ votes.
Verheugen had already put many backs up in the north of the island. In December 2003, President Dentaş had compared the commissioner to "an elephant in a china shop" after he had said that the EU would only take cognisance of the election results in TRNC if the opposition won. Denktaş concluded that Verheugen made these remarks to intervene in the elections. On the day of the referendum, the High Election Board in Lefkosa refused to allow state television station to broadcast Turkish PM Erdogan’s address to the voters in TRNC urging them to vote for the plan. Again, this seemed to be in accordance with the country’s electoral laws.
Little noticed was the following report stating that “perceptions of pressure from the US, the EU, the United Nations and by great part of the Greek political opposition, namely by the Pasok party and its leader George Papandreou also had a negative effect. In fact, Mr. Papandreou pressured Cypriot people into voting "Yes" down to the point of holding a public TV speech directed to the Cypriot People before the Cypriot President Tassos Papadopolous did, which was considered unacceptable and provoking by a large part of the Greek and Cypriot community”.[9]
The Plan’s international sponsors and supporters made no criticism of Papandreou’s intervention or the media coverage in TRNC where all the main outlets were pro-Annan leaving only small-circulation papers, like Vulkan, to present the opposition’s case. BHHRG was told that Kibris media, in particular, had presented a utopian picture of life after Annan even publishing glossy photographs of the kinds of opulent properties which would be available to those condemned to relocation - photographs, it was alleged, that had been lifted from American real estate magazines. People were also led to believe that there would be a tourism boom leading even some of the previously suspicious ex-pats to imagine their dingy English cafes and fish and chip bars would soon overflow with foreign guests.
Perhaps the proponents of the settlement in the north’s main achievement was to have persuaded people that they were poverty-stricken and uniquely disadvantaged in the European context. In fact, most northern Cypriots enjoy a reasonable standard of living helped, no doubt, by the island’s exceptional Mediterranean climate. Roads are good, people own cars, and many homes have private swimming pools. In fact, the inhabitants of TRNC are living in an earthly paradise compared with many areas of the ‘new Europe’ like Poland and the Baltic States.
Resentment and discontent soon lead people to seek salvation from elsewhere rather than solutions at home. ‘Europe’ was sold as the panacea to all local ills and people embraced the idea that, out there, there was a large organization ready to house them, find them jobs and, above all, pay the bills. No one pointed out that it was too late now for TRNC is obtain any formal hand-outs, structural funds on the back of Cyprus’s accession to the EU. Many years and frustrating negotiations lay ahead before that pot of gold will be released. No doubt, the culture of dependency was built into the very structures of TRNC which, rebuffed by the international community, was left to the mercies of subventions from Ankara. No one pointed out that the Greek Cypriots had built up a thriving economy on their own without loans and handouts from the EU or other international ‘donors’.
BHHRG noted that while voting in the south was calm and problem free, both voters and election officials in the north were often bad-tempered and unhelpful. This was partly explained by a ruling of the High Election Board that prevented outsiders from being within 100 yards of a polling station, passed after CNN had announced its intention to conduct exit polls that day. No observers were present on either side of the island. However, there was undoubtedly underlying bitterness in TRNC – many ‘yes’ voters, particularly the elderly, were endorsing the plan with unease under massive pressure from the state and media.
In the event, 67% of Turkish Cypriots voted for the Plan while an overwhelming majority (75.8%) in the south rejected it. Many rejectionists in the north were aware that their cause would be saved by the south, not their own population. Soon after the polls closed in TRNC, a party observer in Lefkosa told BHHRG that the Greeks had said ‘no’, which meant, he said, “the end of the ghastly plan”. However, the result in the south meant that much of the bloom was taken off the victory for the ‘yes’ campaign in TRNC. There was some honking of horns and waving of EU flags in Lekosa that night, but complete victory was thwarted. On this occasion, no one complained about the election registers, even though the number of registered voters in the north had increased from 141,479 to 143,639 within 4 months.

Aftermath

In the following days and weeks, there was much criticism of the Greek Cypriot authorities for their handling of the referendum. At a 26th April meeting in Luxembourg, “EU foreign ministers treated their Greek Cypriot colleague, George Iacovou, to a highly unusual verbal battering at a private lunch, furious over Greek Cypriots rejection of the Annan Plan”[10] BHHRG is not surprised at this as the EU regularly berates countries for ‘disobedience’ in not electing the ‘right’ people or producing the ‘right’ result.
There were vague suggestions that the Plan could be salvaged but, for the time being, it appears to be dead in the water. Those newspapers that had argued in its favour now began to spread predictions of doom and gloom for the Cypriot economy. “The economy is in tatters” wrote the Financial Mirror “our social fabric is disintegrating with no policies to clamp down on the spread of drugs, prostitution, increased robberies and execution-style murders”.[11] In fact, outside the tourist areas the republic appears to visitors as a remarkably well-ordered society. But, there are reports of an increase in drug trafficking – some say that “opening the borders to the occupied areas has increased the supply” (of drugs).[12] Police Chief, Tassos Panayiotou, admitted “since the opening of the border they suspect more heroin is being brought into the republic”.[13] If this is true, the reunification of Cyprus could, ultimately, hinder rather than promote economic prosperity.
Tourism in the south was suddenly presented as tacky and unappealing to the modern, upmarket traveller, a “dead duck”.[14] In fact, one problem for the republic is that the lower end of the package holiday market now finds Cyprus too expensive rather than too cheap. Discriminating folk, we were told, would now prefer to explore the more unspoilt areas in the north. But, this ignored the fact that even if international flights are allowed into TRNC the infrastructure for mass tourism simply isn’t there and although the northern panhandle Karpas peninsula is, indeed, unspoilt, there is a plethora of unattractive, low cost housing developments blighting much of TRNC – something that does not usually appeal to the ‘up-market’ tourist. The service sector is also undeveloped. BHHRG was told that lunch was not being served in the restaurant in Lefkosa’s historic Buyuk han (inn) on 28th April, showing a lack of commercial acumen – the city was a sitting market with hundreds of foreign journalists in town for the referendum.
The ‘yes’ camp based its final appeal to the voters on the prospect of foreign donors and EU structural funds coming into a united Cyprus. This will have fallen on many deaf ears as, unlike most EU newcomers, Cyprus had not built its economy on hand outs and did not see EU membership, anyway, as a means of getting something for nothing. The republic will be one of the few entrants in 2004 to be a net contributor to the EU.
Perhaps the most unattractive message from supporters of a ‘yes’ vote – like the Financial Mirror – was that the south would still have “indirect domination” of a united Cyprus as “Greek Cypriots will indirectly dominate the agenda because of their experience... higher educational and technological standards”[15] This admission directly underscores the reasons for President Denktas’s opposition to the Plan but it is unlikely Mr. Talat or any of its cheer leaders in TRNC pointed out such cynicism to their voters.